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The financial innovations of the late 1990s have led to the emergence of a significant number 
of new instruments, in particular in the market for hedging credit risk. This paper, based on 
an original dataset of transactions and quotes, looks at credit default swaps drawn on 
sovereign countries. The study of the credit default swap market around major financial 
crises leads to several results: Markets' consideration of ratings around the world changes 
dramatically after major financial crises, even for those countries that are not in crisis. While 
ratings seem suddenly to matter more, pricing uncertainty increases as well. Thus large 
financial crises appear to create strong information uncertainty, rather than resolve previous 
uncertainty. After a major crisis event, there is significant ‘flight-to-quality’ that is 
accompanied by a strong relative rise of demand for sovereign credit protection.  We also 
document the extra-significance of transaction data compared to quote data in an OTC 
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Executive Summary 
 
The financial innovations of the late 1990s have led to the emergence of a significant amount 
of new instruments, in particular in the market for hedging credit risk. Credit default swaps 
(CDS) are the most popular specimen in the emerging world of credit derivatives. In recent 
years, much of the academic literature has focused on the theory on valuation issues of such 
instruments in the corporate case (Duffie (1998), Hull and White (2000)), but far less work 
has focused on empirical aspects (Cossin et al., (2002), and Houweling and Vorst (2001)) 
and no work that we know of has looked at it as an indicator of sovereign risk information.  
 
Default swaps are used to exchange risks that are already traded, but not separately, in 
existing markets such as in bond markets (where sovereign risk is not separated from interest 
rate risk). The underlying instruments on which credit derivatives on sovereign risk are 
written are typically Brady bonds or other sovereign bond issues. Credit default swaps are 
financial instruments that allow lenders to pass on to others the risk that borrowers will 
default, in return for a recurring payment: the CDS rate. The seller of the swap typically 
agrees, in case of a credit event, to take over the debt at face value. 
  
Research on Credit Default Swaps has important implications for a better understanding of 
sovereign risk behavior, and represents an opportunity to study credit risk from another angle 
than the usual instruments studied in the literature such as bonds and swaps. Credit default 
swaps, only marginally present up to the 1990s, have become an increasingly valuable 
instrument used by market participants to hedge credit risk. It is appealing to banks and other 
financial institutions, since it allows to buy protection for their loan portfolios and to take 
credit risk without having to finance it. One of the major features of credit derivatives is the 
allowance of the transfer of pure credit risk from one counterparty to another. Positively, 
credit derivatives have fostered improved liquidity in the cash credit market by making it 
easier to access a diversified portfolio of names and, when desirable, actively ‘short’ credit 
risk. Moreover, the market does appear to be moving toward greater liquidity and 
diversification as more reference entities are actively traded.  
  
Analyzing credit risk via its most popular instrument has important advantages with respect 
to analyzing the behavior of bond spreads: i) CDSs are by far the most liquid instrument in 
the family of credit derivatives, ii) CDSs are not subject to the distortions created by 
particular covenants inherent in bond contracts (such as for example early call-features), iii) 
they allow for a more direct analysis of credit risk, i.e. the influence of interest rates, rather 
than the more indirect linkage of interest rate based securities such as bonds, and iv) the 
increasing harmonization of CDS contracts allows for a more direct comparison of cross 
country default risk. Nevertheless, as with every new financial instrument, credit default 
swaps remain an exotic instrument and disadvantages do exist, namely the rather thin 
liquidity in the overall credit derivatives market. 
  
In this paper, we take advantage of an original database of transaction, bid, and ask data of 
credit default swaps to study the informational content of financial crises for assessing 
sovereign risk in the rest of the world. We do not address the issue of the information 
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provided by the crisis on the concerned country rates but rather the information on other 
countries (where the crisis did not occur but credit pricing changes may have occurred 
following the crisis). The idea stems from the strong literature that exists in contagion effects 
(Kodres and Pritsker, 2002). It is well known (and appears also in our data) that when Brazil 
goes through a crisis, the rest of the world’s credit standing will be somewhat affected but 
that Latin America's credit standing will be affected relatively more. In this research, we do 
not address contagion issues directly. We are more interested in the overall informational and 
market impact of large financial crises on assessment of credit risk in the rest of the world. 
Our results show that sovereign risk pricing uncertainty rises after rather than before crises, 
that ratings find a new glory after crises (while other factors are used for pricing before 
crises), that demand for hedging sovereign risk rises strongly after crises, creating an 
imbalance in the markets but not necessarily leading to more transactions. We also document 
– somewhat surprisingly - a flight to quality in this market: this may seem surprising as the 
CDS instruments represent a market to hedge for quality. We document the higher 
informational content of transaction data versus quote data. Overall, everything tends to show 
that major financial crises may lead to a strong market uncertainty on how to price sovereign 
risk rather than to provide actual pricing information, and that this information uncertainty 
rises after rather than before the crisis itself. In that sense, crises are not a resolution of 
pricing uncertainty but rather give rise to pricing uncertainty themselves. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The financial innovations of the late 1990s have led to the emergence of a significant amount 
of new instruments, in particular in the market for hedging credit risk. Credit default swaps 
(CDS) are the most popular specimen in the emerging world of credit derivatives. In recent 
years, much of the academic literature has focused on the theory on valuation issues of such 
instruments in the corporate case (Duffie (1998), Hull and White (2000)), but far less work 
has focused on empirical aspects (Cossin et al., (2002), and Houweling and Vorst (2001)) 
and no work that we know of has looked at it as an indicator of sovereign risk information.  
 
Default swaps are used to exchange risks that are already traded, but not separately, in 
existing markets such as in bond markets (where sovereign risk is not separated from interest 
rate risk). The underlying instruments on which credit derivatives on sovereign risk are 
written are typically Brady bonds or other sovereign bond issues. Credit default swaps are 
financial instruments that allow lenders to pass on to others the risk that borrowers will 
default, in return for a recurring payment: the CDS rate. The seller of the swap typically 
agrees, in case of a credit event
2, to take over the debt at face value. 
 
 




Protection buyer  Protection seller 





Research on Credit Default Swaps has important implications for a better understanding of 
sovereign risk behavior, and represents an opportunity to study credit risk from another angle 
than the usual instruments studied in the literature such as bonds and swaps. Credit default 
swaps, only marginally present up to the 1990s, have become an increasingly valuable 
instrument used by market participants to hedge credit risk. It is appealing to banks and other 
financial institutions, since it allows to buy protection for their loan portfolios and to take 
                                                 
2 According to the ISDA, "credit event" definitions include bankruptcy, failure to pay, restructuring, 
repudiations/ moratorium, obligation default and obligation acceleration (Moody’s 2001). The contingent 
amount is the difference between the face value of the bond and its market value and is paid at the time where 
the underlying bond defaults. The buyer of protection pays the annuity premium (or twice annually, or 
quarterly) until the time of the credit event of the maturity date, whichever is first. The term 'swap' is applicable 
to credit swaps because they can be viewed, under certain special circumstances, as a swap of a default-free 
floating rate note for a defaultable floating rate note. This is exactly the idea behind looking at the relation 
between bond spreads traded on the sovereign debt market and this rather innovative instrument to hedge 
sovereign default risk, incorporated by the credit default swap. 
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credit risk without having to finance it. One of the major features of credit derivatives is the 
allowance of the transfer of pure credit risk from one counterparty to another. Positively, 
credit derivatives have fostered to improve liquidity in the cash credit market by making it 
easier to access a diversified portfolio of names and, when desirable, actively ‘short’ credit 
risk. Moreover, the market does appear to be moving toward greater liquidity and 
diversification as more reference entities are actively traded.  
  
Analyzing credit risk via its most popular instrument has important advantages with respect 
to analyzing the behavior of bond spreads: i) CDSs are by far the most liquid instrument in 
the family of credit derivatives, ii) CDSs are not subject to the distortions created by 
particular covenants inherent in bond contracts (such as for example early call-features), iii) 
they allow for a more direct analysis of credit risk, i.e. the influence of interest rates, rather 
than the more indirect linkage of interest rate based securities such as bonds, and iv) the 
increasing harmonization of CDS contracts allows for a more direct comparison of cross 
country default risk. Nevertheless, as with every new financial instrument, credit default 
swaps remain an exotic instrument and disadvantages do exist, namely the rather thin 
liquidity in the overall credit derivatives market. 
  
In this paper, we take advantage of an original database of transaction, bid, and ask data of 
credit default swaps to study the informational content of financial crises for assessing 
sovereign risk in the rest of the world. We do not address the issue of the information 
provided by the crisis on the concerned country rates but rather the information on other 
countries (where the crisis did not occur but credit pricing changes may have occurred 
following the crisis). The idea stems from the strong literature that exists in contagion effects 
(Kodres and Pritsker, 2002). It is well known (and appears also in our data) that when Brazil 
goes through a crisis, the rest of the world’s credit standing will be somewhat affected but 
that Latin America's credit standing will be affected relatively more. In this research, we do 
not address contagion issues directly. We are more interested in the overall informational and 
market impact of large financial crises on assessment of credit risk in the rest of the world. 
Our results show that sovereign risk pricing uncertainty rises after rather than before crises, 
that ratings find a new glory after crises (while other factors are used for pricing before 
crises), that demand for hedging sovereign risk rises strongly after crises, creating an 
imbalance in the markets but not necessarily leading to more transactions. We also document 
– somewhat surprisingly - a flight to quality in this market: this may seem surprising as the 
CDS instruments represent a market to hedge for quality. We document the higher 
informational content of transaction data versus quote data. Overall, everything tends to show 
that major financial crises may lead to a strong market uncertainty on how to price sovereign 
risk rather than to provide actual pricing information, and that this information uncertainty 
rises after rather than before the crisis itself. In that sense, crises are not a resolution of 
pricing uncertainty but rather give rise to pricing uncertainty themselves. 
  
The paper proceeds by first describing the dataset and analyzing transactions versus quotes as 
well as relationship of CDS rates to sovereign ratings. We then describe the three financial 
crises considered and investigate the changing impact of ratings after crises, the more salient 
elements of market changes as well as the information issues revealed by bid-ask spreads. 
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II.   OUR CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP DATASET 
The Credit Default Swap prices are obtained from a major inter-bank dealer in London. The 
dataset consists of: 
  several thousand one-way quotes (total of 4028). One-way quotes represent the 
request to sell or buy a CDS at a particular price by the asking party 
  2097 two way quotes, each of them with a bid-ask spread 
  314 actual transaction data. The traded data is cleared market data and represents the 
fact that the actual transaction took place. These prices can be considered as fair 
prices since they represent the mutual agreement from the buyer’s view, i.e. his 
willingness to pay, and from the seller's view, representing his willingness to receive 
the swap rate payment. 
  
The prices of the CDS are denoted in basis points per annum. The notional amount for the 
contracts range from USD 1 to 50 Mio. The major part of the CDS data has a maturity of five 
years, within a total range of one to ten years. 
  
The structure of the CDS market for sovereigns can be seen from table 1. Given this 
relatively exotic, new financial derivative, it seems from the data that the major 'players' in 
this market are mostly well-established banking institutions, a fact confirmed by Beattie 
(2000). The latter author emphasizes the major role of internationally operating banks and 
security firms in the OTC-market, those institutions taking up the bulge of the market. Given 
this, we will not consider here the possible implications of counter-party default risk (see 
Duffee and Zhou, 1999).  Indeed, the top three counterparties were all ranked AA or better. 
This is a result that holds generally for the credit derivatives market, where counterparty risk 
is heavily concentrated among top tier banks (Fitch, 2003). 
 
  
Table 1. The ten major counterparties involved. This table summarizes the most frequent 
counterparties (on both bid and ask side) in our credit default swap dataset, as well as the underlying 
ratings of the institutions.  
Institution Rating 
Deutsche Bank  AA 
General Re  AAA 
JP Morgan  AA 
Lehman A 
Merrill Lynch  AA- 
Paribas A- 
Rabobank AAA 
Salomon Bros (Citibank)  A 
Société Générale  AA- 
UBS AA+ 
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The dataset under study here spans from the time period of June 1997 until February 2000. It 
encompasses some of the major financial crises that occurred in the 1990s, such as the South-
East Asian turmoil in October 1997, the Russian default in mid-August 1998 and the 
Brazilian devaluation in January 1999. Table 2 shows the distribution of our dataset over 




  Table 2. Distribution of our total dataset over time. We divide our dataset according 
to transactions data, one- and two way quotes, as well as the ratio of bids and asks on a monthly basis.  
 





            (Bid) (Ask)     
1998 January  13  10  5  6  0.83 
 February  2  54  42  36  1.17 
 March  2  29  10  38  0.26 
 April   9  48  41  76  0.54 
 May 12  30  38  36  1.06 
 June 18  64  76  50  1.52 
 July  18  105  105  141  0.74 
 August  22  70  84  62  1.35 
 September    22  82  115  102  1.13 
 October  9  75  73  126  0.58 
 November    16  74  68  179  0.38 
   December  5  80  67  72  0.93 
1999 January  21  132  138  131  1.05 
 February  13  65  72  132  0.55 
 March  6  103  57  121  0.47 
 April    15  113  80  123  0.65 
 May 10  72  63  84  0.75 
 June 10  124  82  79  1.04 
 July  19  140  99  102  0.97 
 August  12  143  102  135  0.76 
 September    23  150  90  127  0.71 
 October  11  82  77  87  0.89 
 November    5  69  62  71  0.87 
   December  4  52  14  28  0.50 
2000 January  11  63  21  93  0.23 
   February  14  56  33  43  0.77 
 Total  322  2085  1714  2280  - 
            
Total   Average p.m  12.4  80.2  65.9  87.7  0.80 
 
                                                 
3 We did not include the data-entries for the months at the end of 1997, given the very few data points available. 
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A.   The Informational Content of Transactions versus Quotes   
A major issue that arises in our study is how to use quote information versus transaction 
information. Most academic studies working on credit risk or sovereign risk tend to work 
from quotes, as quotes are more readily available and lead to much larger sample sizes usable 
for econometric tests than transaction data. The advantages of looking at sovereign risk is 
that - when available, and stripped of other influences such as specific features such as call 
features or guarantees - bond spreads are a good alternative measure to CDS rates (see Chan-
Lau, 2003; Singh, 2003). We thus look at the relationship between CDS rates and bond 
spreads and see whether CDS rates quotes or transactions relate differently to spreads. In 
order to do so, we regress – via simple OLS estimation– the transaction, two- and one way 
quotes (both for bids and asks) of the CDS data available on the corresponding country 
stripped bond spreads, as supplied by JP Morgan
4. The equation thus estimated is: 
 
Spread Country CDS * β α + =  
 
Intuitively, we would expect to find a very high explanatory power of this simple regression, 
as both the CDS rates and the bond spreads should reflect the pure sovereign credit risk of 
the underlying country. This explanatory power – as reported by the
2 R - should be higher for 
transaction data than for quotes, reflecting the higher informational content in sovereign CDS 
data. The results are reported in table 3. 
  
The bond spread data are spreads on sovereign bonds denominated in US Dollars from the 
Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) and the EMBI+ index from JP Morgan. This is daily, 
contemporaneous data, and the results show the regressions of the CDS rates and the 
corresponding bond spreads for each country. The sovereign spread of a country's foreign 
debt is the spread above the US treasury spot curve that equates the discounted scheduled 
payments on the country's debt with the market price of the sovereign bond. We abstract 
from the complication of market expectations about trends in the exchange rates of the dollar 
and other major currencies. JP Morgan, one of the major dealers in this market, constructs a 
value-weighted index of all emerging market sovereign indexes, called the Emerging Market 
Bond Index (EMBI), and computes the corresponding spreads. JP Morgan supplies 'stripped' 
spreads, i.e. net of enhancements which are typically on principal payable at the end of 30 
years plus on interest for up to 18 months, and the collateral set aside for these enhancements 
makes the risk of some of these instruments a mixture of pure country risk, zero credit risk on 
the US Zero Coupon used as the risk free reference and other assets used for collateral. The 
stripped spreads for the individual countries supplied from JP Morgan are calculated by 
removing the influence of these enhancements, in order to capture the pure country risk. 
  
While heavy overall as a methodology, this analysis leads to a lack of data for the crises 
event study, at the heart of the present paper. Nonetheless, it allows us to address a major 
                                                 
4 We would like to thank Alvin Ying for supplying us with the data for countries’ bond spreads. 
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issue, one often mentioned in the academic literature but seldom truly addressed: whether the 
information inherent in quotes is as good as the information content of transactions. In order 
to answer this question, we look at the information content inherent in our country 
regressions, and compare the results of those regressions between transactions, one- and two-
way quotes.  
 
Table 3. Summary of regression of transactions, two and one way quotes and the 
correponding country spreads. The CDS transaction, two- and one way quotes for each of the 
countries are regressed on the individual country EMBI-bond spreads from JP Morgan. The OLS 
regressions are done over the whole sample period for the dataset. The second column represents the 
total number of observations for each of the individual countries. 
 
Country Transactions 
Two Way Quotes 
(Bids) 
Two Way Quotes 
(Asks) 
One Way Quotes 
(Bids) 
One Way Quotes 
(Asks) 

















Argentina    0.91  8 0.65  81 0.65  81 0.56  39 0.63  48 
Brazil    0.72  11 0.83  86 0.82  86 0.87  33 0.90  25 
China    0.48  82 0.32  348 0.34  348 0.45  263 0.35  556 
Mexico    0.90  9 0.59  104 0.62  104 0.52  50 0.75  68 
Philippines    0.90  19 0.73  117 0.74  117 0.74  148 0.80  153 
South  Africa    0.35  6 0.37  19 0.14  19 0.33  45 0.61  44 
Thailand    0.95  15 0.87  85 0.84  85 0.89  85 0.84  148 
Turkey    0.19  3 0.59  35 0.62  35 0.53  57 0.70  68 
 
  
The results shown in the table above indicate that for all countries where the number of 
transactions is large enough (larger than 15 here),  the  is higher for transactions data, 
compared to both one - and two way quotes, but the is similar for the two-way and one 
way quotes. When transactions are not numerous, it is not obvious whether quotes provide 
correct information (see Mexico). The informational content of transactions data appears 
more significative than for quotes, and having two way information does not necessarily add 
much information. Because of this property of transaction data, we will study the impact of 
financial crises on these transaction data first, and then analyze imbalances between bids and 
asks and finally at the impact of the crises considered on bid-ask spreads, as all provide 
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B.   The Relationship between CDS Rates and Sovereign Ratings 
We have determined that transaction data are preferable for pricing purposes to quote data.  
Because of data restrictions, it is often easier to use ratings rather than bond spreads as a 
main source of default risk information. In a first step, we want to test for the influence of 
credit ratings and the credit default swap rate. Ratings on sovereigns contain important public 
information on the sovereign risk of a country, and rating changes have a significant effect on 
the prices of outstanding debt (Cantor and Packer, 1996). Therefore, a strong relationship 
between ratings and credit default swap rates is to be expected. We investigate it on our 
overall sample in order to be able to assess later the impact of financial crises on the CDS 
rate - rating relationship. 
  
Intuitively, the relationship between credit default swap rates and ratings should be of a non-
linear character. Ideally, in order to get a more precise shape of the relationship, we would 
directly implement and test a model - however, such a theoretical framework, already rare in 
the case of credit derivatives for corporates, is virtually non-existent for sovereigns, with no 
current agreement on what model would perform best. We thus proceed here in a first step 
with a simple analysis (as this is not the center topic of the study). We estimate linear, semi 
log and power relationships. In the power test, we fit for the curvature of the relationship 
while imposing it on both the linear and semi-log regressions. We thus give quite some 
flexibility to the shape of the swap rate/ credit rating relationship. In brief, in the power 
regressions, we check for the relationship of the following type: 
 
β αRating CDSR =  
 
whereβ  is capturing the shape of the relationship. We can write this equivalently to: 
 
) ln( * ln ) Rating CDSR ln( β α + =  
 
The regressions for the semi-log tests are of the form: 
 
Rating CDSR * ) ln( β α + =  
 
and for the linear test, the specification is: 
 
Rating CDSR * β α + =  
 
In table 4 we show the results of the semi-log, linear and power tests on transactions data 
only (Figure 1 illustrates the shapes thus obtained). The whole time span of the dataset, 
November 1997 until February 2000, is used.
5 
                                                 
5 There are 314 data points for the transactions in our sample. 
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Table 4: Regression results of CDS rates and Ratings. Results show Semi-Log, Linear and 
Power Tests of CDS transaction data on total ratings. There are a total of 314 transaction data points 
in our sample. 
 
  








  Semi-Log 
Test 
Linear Test  Power Test 
      
Coefficient 0.26  0.004  1.1 
t-statistic 19.33 11.3 16.67 
     




Figure 1. Best fit of semi-log, linear and power regression on entire CDS sample. The 
figure below shows the results of the best fit of the power, linear and semi-log test of CDS transaction 
data on the corresponding ratings. 
Entire Credit Default Swap Rate 
























   - 12 - 
 
The semi-log test provides by far the better fit. Overall, more than half of the variance in 
default swap rates can be explained simply by the corresponding rating. One can thus 
confirm that there is some strong relationship between ratings and CDS rates, best described 
in our simple framework by a semi-log relationship. How this relationship is affected by 
financial crises is one of the topics of this study, as it addresses part of information 
dissemination in financial markets during crises. 
  
 
III.   THE THREE CRISES EPISODES CONSIDERED 
As mentioned before, our dataset comprises roughly three years, starting in June 1997 and 
ending in February 2000. During this time span, the major global financial events with 
respect to payment difficulties by sovereign countries can be summarized as follows: 
  
  The devaluation and debt restructuring of the Russian Federation in August 1998 
  
  Brazil's devaluation and financial collapse in early January 1999 
 
  The remarkable default of Ecuador on its outstanding Eurobonds in September 1999 - 
the first country ever to default on its Brady bond obligations. While in some regard a 
more minor crisis to the rest of the world than the Russian and the Brazilian crises, 
the Ecuador crisis is a useful benchmark in our study to check whether smaller crises 
have qualitatively similar impact to larger ones (or whether crises impact require a 
threshold crisis size). 
  
Furthermore, the South-East Asian Crisis, with the attack on the Thai Baht in the summer of 
1997, and on the Hong Kong dollar on October 17, 1997 borders our sample period. 
Nonetheless we lack corresponding data points and we do not investigate it. We should also 
note the financial restructurings of Pakistan (November 1999) and the Republic of Ukraine 
(February 2000). These two events were minor with respect to the international scene (both 
were resolved quickly with exchange offers) and are not directly studied here. 
 
A.   Economic Background to the Three Crises under Study here 
We hereby give a summary of the economic context of each crisis before considering 
information issues during the crises themselves.  Figure 2 shows the evolution of emerging 
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Figure 2. Emerging market sovereign spreads for Russia, Brazil and Ecuador. The figure 
below shows the EMBI Global index of JP Morgan measuring aggregate sovereign risk in Emerging 
markets, as well as the individual country spreads of Russia, Brazil and Ecuador from January 1998 
to December 2000. The spreads are expressed in Basis Points. 
Emerging market sovereign risk:
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  The Russian Default dated August 17, 1998 
 
On August 17, 1998, Russia announced a combination of debt restructuring, devaluation and 
moratorium on private principal repayments. Russia had been downgraded first by Moody's 
in March 1998, and then by all three major agencies in May and early June. 
  
The newly founded Russian Republic ran throughout the 1990s large budget deficits, which 
implied steadily higher debt servicing costs. The main feature of domestic debt was its short-
term character, which strengthened the governments' need to raise permanently new capital 
in order to serve its debt obligations. The dangerous height of the budget deficit was 
aggravated by difficulties for the central government to collect revenues (mainly a problem 
of raising taxes). The macroeconomy also experienced a huge contraction: GDP fell by 33% 
in the years from 1993 until 1998 (IMF, 1998). Domestic banks started to borrow 
aggressively overseas and used those funds to buy high-risk domestic bonds with high 
expected yields - a strategy which exposed the banking system to increasing sovereign credit 
risk (see Duffie et al., 2002). By October 1997, oil prices, representing one of Russia's main 
exports, declined steadily until 1998, a situation which deteriorated the current account 
further throughout the first half of 1998. By mid-1998, the external terms of trade had 
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deteriorated to unsustainable levels of 18% on a year-to-year basis. Concerning the external 
debt structure in the upfront of the coming crisis from March until July 1998, there was a 
large accumulation in the outstanding stock of Russian Eurobonds, namely by non-residents 
who had started piling up high-yield Ruble denominated domestic securities (such as GKO's 
and OFZ's) and other Russian debt instruments. 
  
On top of the old, restructured Soviet-era debt that the Russian Federation took over, Russia 
built significant amounts of new debt in order to finance its increasing budget deficits. The 
latter were notably financed by the issuing of Ruble denominated Treasury bonds (GKOs and 
OFZs), which reached by mid-1998 a total amount of USD 70 Billion, one third of which 
being held by foreigners (IMF, 1998). Starting in 1993, the so-called 'MinFins' - dollar 
denominated bonds issued as payments to Russian exporters on the account of domestic 
banks - were increasingly sold to foreigners
6. In 1996, Russia issued its first Eurobond 
(several others were issued in 1997-98) in various currencies, with implicit cross-default 
triggers. 
  
On August 17, 1998, Russia announced a compulsory restructuring of the domestic debt 
(GKO and OFZ), and a 90-day moratium was placed on foreign commercial debt, and the 
currently existing exchange rate band was abandoned. At this time, it was unclear whether 
Russia would also default on its external, sovereign debt. 
  
What was the market's perception of the default probability of a Russian non-payment during 
that period? Merrick (2001)
7 shows that during the crisis, the implied default probability on 
Russian debt rose sharply during the week prior to the GKO default announcement, and 
continued to rise once the crisis erupted. In order to assess the relevant default probabilities
8, 
he divides his 6-month sample period into a pre-GKO default sample period - ranging from 
July 1998 until August 14, 1998 - and one for the post-GKO sub-sample period, from August 
17 until December 14, 1998. He finds a significant structural break occurring in the 
probability of default at the particular crisis date (August 17, 1998). On the particular day of 
the announcement, the base default rate jumped overnight to nearly 40%, its average value 
until the end of the sample period. Duffie et al. (2002) find that the price of the 'MinFin' 
bonds – dollar denominated bonds, that are explicitly recognized as an obligation of the 
Russian Federation - fell by approximately 80% during the week of the Russian default, 
suggesting that market participants were indeed surprised by this credit event right up to the 
event itself happening. According to the authors, after the default announcement on August 
17, 1998, bond prices reflected investors' expected payment at maturity, and investors' 
                                                 
6 Ministry of Finance bonds ("Min Fin's") are dollar denominated bonds that are explicitly recognised as an 
obligation of the Russian Federation. Approximately U$ 7.9 bn of Min Fin bonds were issued in May 1993 as 
compensation to enterprises whose dollar accounts at Vnesheconombank had been frozen at the end of 1991. 
7 Merrick (2001) extracts the (adjusted, risk neutral) default probability term structure and the implied recovery 
ratio of the market for outstanding Emerging Market bonds during the Russian GKO default crisis in August 
1998. 
8 His sample period for the five Russian Eurobonds ranges only from July 1998 until December 1998. 
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expectations were subsequently revised upwards over time toward one-third of face value as 
market and economic conditions changed. 
 
 
  The Brazilian Devaluation:  January 13, 1999 
  
By the end of 1997, Brazil's combination of overvalued currency, loose fiscal policy and 
tight money supply had resulted in large and growing public-sector deficits and a big hole in 
its current account. The government pushed interest rates to very high levels and announced 
important fiscal squeezes. In November 1998, the country won a large IMF-led bailout 
package of the size of 3% of GDP, tied to emergency measures such as tax increases and 
spending cuts, with the goal of reassuring investors that a devaluation would not be 
undertaken. However, investors became convinced that a devaluation was under way. 
Between August 1998 and January 1999, Brazil experienced important capital outflows, as 
first foreign and then local investors pulled out. To make matters worse, a local governor 
proclaimed a moratorium on that province's debt, putting the country's fiscal efforts into 
terminal doubt. Brazil announced on January 13, 1999 the official devaluation of its 
currency, the Real. This brought about a real depreciation of 35% of the currency in the eight 
weeks following that event, and the recession that was already under way deepened. 
 
The macro-economy for Brazil had a gloomy outlook: with GDP stagnating at its previous 
level, the balance on the current account went into negative by USD 35bn in 1998, from its 
similar previous level of USD 30bn. Inflation, which had record low levels after the 
introduction of the Real in early 1994, started to rise once again, and Brazil was facing a 
serious battle to regain the confidence of the financial markets again. Fears that the 
government might default on debts had receded but not disappeared, even after two months 
of the outbreak of the crisis. 
  
International banks aggressively cut credit lines to their local operations in Brazil and 
prepared for a possible coerced rollover of inter-bank debt (as happened in Korea before) by 
also reducing holdings of domestic debt. Following the devaluation of January 12, 1999, a 
key macroeconomic uncertainty had been resolved. In the weeks leading up to the mid-
March voluntary agreement (formalized on March 31, launched together with a strengthened 
IMF arrangement) between international banks and the government to maintain exposures at 
end-February levels for six months, rollover ratios stabilized at a high level. By April 1999, 
there were strong indicators that the Brazilian economy was on track for recovery in the 
absence of a systematic banking crisis after the devaluation in January, and as most local 
commercial banks recorded record first quarter profits, some international banks started to 
increase their exposures above what was required under the agreement. 
 
  
  Ecuador Brady Bond Default: September 28, 1999 
  
The small Andean nation of Ecuador missed the payment of USD 500mio of Eurobonds in 
September 1999. Thus, on September 28, 1999, Ecuador became the first sovereign to 
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officially default on Brady bonds after the expiration of a 30-day grace period. It can be 
argued that the crisis had been long in the making and reflected internal political problems 
aggravated by external shocks, such as the 'el nino' hurricane. At the time of the default, 
Ecuador's external bonded debt consisted of collaterized Brady's, Par- and Discount Bonds, 
with an outstanding amount of USD 3.1bn, un-collaterized Brady (past-due interest, PDI's) 
amounting to USD 2.8 billion, and a stock of USD 0.5 billion of dollar denominated 
Eurobonds. Markets were aware of the increasing risk, as reflected by the high secondary 
market spreads. However, although the Ecuadorian default was seen by investors as a test 
case for the future approach of private sector involvement into bond restructuring, the effects 
of Ecuador's default were effectively ring-fenced as its importance in many emerging market 
investors portfolios was small - Ecuador's weight in JP Morgan's EMBI+ index is merely 
1.2%. After the rather successful dollarization program and the potential three year USD 2 




IV.   THE CHANGING IMPACT OF SOVEREIGN CREDIT RATINGS ON CDS-RATES AFTER 
CRISES 
  In line with the previous analysis, we test whether the influence of credit ratings on 
the credit default swap prices varies before and after the financial crises identified above. For 
this, we define for each of the Russian, Brazilian and Ecuadorian crisis a three-month 
window period before and after the crisis. We regress CDS-rates of all sovereigns, excluding 
the country considered, on the rating of the corresponding sovereign before and after the 
crisis. The regressions are estimated separately for the crises windows before and after each 
crisis, and are pure cross-section estimations. Like most analysts who transform bond ratings 
into data for regression analysis (Cantor and Packer, 1996), we assign numerical values to the 
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s ratings. This can easily be done, since every Moody’s 
symbol has its counterpart in Standard and Poor’s rating scale, and this correspondence 
allows us to compare the sovereign ratings assigned by the two agencies
9 (see also Cantor 
and Packer, 1996). This simple technique reveals how much explanatory power sovereign 
ratings have before and after the crisis. While these rough results are refined underneath (by 
controlling for quality changes for example), results seem solid: for major crises, ratings 
explain more just after the crisis than just before, and by a large amount. At the same time 
that their explanatory power has increased tremendously, their relationship to the rates (as 
found in the coefficient of the regression) is not changed: everything is as if the pricing 
model that was there before is still valid but that ratings are suddenly more considered in that 
pricing model. 
 
  Tables 5, 6 and 7 give the regression results centered around crisis time (3months 
window before and after) for the Russian, Brazilian and Ecuadorian crises.     
                                                 
9 In particular, we assign to AAA/Aaa = 1, and so on,through CCC/C=17. 
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Table 5. Russian Crisis Three months windows centered around the crisis date.  
       
Three Months Before 
Crisis Window   
Three Months After  Crisis 
Window 
  
       
     
Dependent Variable: CDS 
rates (Transaction Data)   
Dependent Variable: CDS 
rates (Transaction Data) 
 
















             
Coefficient 1.2  0.23  0.0055    1.24  0.3  0.00738 
t-statistic  4.42 4.2 3.62    7.945  8.55 5.63 
           
R-squared  0.28 0.26 0.21    0.58 0.61 0.41 
 
   
 
Table 6. Brazil Crisis Three months windows centered around the crisis date.  
 
       
Three Months Before 
Crisis Window   
Three Months After  
Crisis Window 
  
       
     
Dependent Variable: CDS 
rates (Transaction Data)   
Dependent Variable: CDS 
rates (Transaction Data) 
 
















             
Coefficient  1.045 0.25  0.0047    1.034 0.27  0.0039 
t-statistic  6.78 7.67 4.59    11.2  14.48  6.78 
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Table 7. Ecuador Default   
       
Three Months Before 
Crisis Window   
Three Months After  Crisis 
Window 
  
       
     
Dependent Variable: CDS 
rates (Transaction Data)   
Dependent Variable: CDS 
rates (Transaction Data) 
 
















             
Coefficient  1.31 0.31  0.0058    1.39  0.3 0.005 
t-statistic  6.61  10.54 6.3    4.17 6.25 5.22 
           
R-squared  0.48 0.7 0.45    0.42  0.62  0.53 
 
In both major crises, the impact of ratings on default swap rates becomes much stronger after  
crises. All occurs as if ratings information becomes suddenly more important around crises. 
This is not explained by a sole change of ratings as confirmed later in the study. This 
information diffusion is the heart of this study. The relatively minor Ecuadorian crisis, where 
no such impact appears, confirms that crises need to be major for ratings to be considered 
with a new eye by the markets. 
 
 Interestingly, the relationship between ratings and cds rates does not seem to change (i.e. the 
coefficient in the above regressions does not seem to change significantly before and after 
crises). This is confirmed statistically in Table 8. We define a dummy variable D (D=0 
before crisis, D=1 after crisis), and regress the (log of) CDS rates on the dummy, the log of 
ratings and interact the dummy with the ratings - the significance of this interaction term will 
tell us if ratings will have an effect on the prices of CDSs. In particular, the regressions take 
the form: 
 
Ratings Dummy Ratings Dummy CDSR * * * * ) log( θ γ β α + + + =  
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Table 8. Results of Semi Log test of regression of the (log of) CDS rates on the dummy, 
ratings, plus an interaction of ratings and dummy. The dependant variable is the CDS rate. 







        







    






  Coefficient t-
statistic 
Prob.    Coefficient t-
statistic 
Prob.    Coefficient t-
statistic 
Prob. 
                    
Constant  -6.43  -13.53 0.00000    -6.28  -26.28 0.00000    -7.41  -22.7  0.00000 
Dummy 0.087  0.15  0.00000    -0.099  -0.311  0.75600    -0.056  -0.11  0.92000 
Ratings 0.23  4.39  0.00000    0.252  9.5713  0.00000    0.31  9.4  0.00000 
Dummy* 
Ratings 0.062  0.97  0.88140    0.023  0.612  0.54020    0.0096 
-
0.0181 0.86000 
                                  
R-Squared 0.47      0.75      0.67    
 
 
As reported in table 8, the coefficient of the interaction Dummy*Ratings variable is not 
significant for all three crises considered. Ratings thus become more important in the pricing 
but pricing remains the same (i.e. pricing models would not change, but the ratings impact 
becomes more significant). 
 
Interestingly, the large improvement in explanatory power of ratings seem to happen at the 
transaction level rather than at the bid or the ask level. While these seem more related to 
ratings after the crisis than before the crisis, the improvement is not comparable as to the 
change for transaction data (e.g., for the Russian crisis, the  of the two-way bid on ratings 
goes from 41% to 51%, from 40% to 53% for two-way asks, from 57% to 63% for one-way 
bids, and from 50% to 75% for one-way quote asks. For the Brazilian crisis, the  ’s of the 
2 way bid goes from 57% to 61%, of the 2-way ask from 58% to 60% and R-squares go 
down for the one way bid and ask rates). Detailed results are not reproduced here but are 
available from the authors. There is no clear asymmetry between bid or ask improvements 
either so that it cannot be clearly said whether the market is truly moved by the buyer of 
protection or by the sellers of protection during crises. 
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This result is in line with what many practitioners have indicated about this rather exotic 
market: the true information is aggregated at transaction level, but not necessarily at the 
quote level, which tends to be "indicative", meaning not necessarily close to realization. 
  
To conclude, the most fundamental result of this section is that after crises, ratings become 
suddenly more important
10. The shape of their relationship to CDS rates (value of the 
coefficient) is not affected but ratings suddenly explain much more of the variation in rates. 
All appears as if, suddenly, after crises, market participants pay more attention to ratings than 
It is not that ratings provide new information. It seems that participants may have paid 
attention to other factors before the crisis that suddenly are ignored in favor of the rating after 
the crisis. Because there is no impact on coefficients, these factors seemed to be uncorrelated 
to rating information. While the pricing of CDS rates evolves as described here, we may 
wonder how the market is transforming itself around financial crises. This in itself will 
further illuminate the transmission of information (or lack thereof) of financial crises.   
  
  
V.   HOW DOES THE SOVEREIGN CREDIT MARKET CHANGE AROUND CRISES? 
 
A.   Flight to Quality after Crises 
As shown in table 9, during major crises, there seems to be evidence of flight to quality, even 
in the CDS market, i.e. in the market for insuring sovereign underlying
11. This seems to be an 
interesting and somewhat paradoxical finding. Generally, flight to quality of investors is a 
well-known pattern during financial crises. Indeed, this is a particular paradigm of the 
financial episodes of the 1990s, where investors flee countries with seemingly unrelated 
fundaments, and redirect their funds towards safer assets (Kodres and Pritksker, 2002). The 
credit derivative market, however, is a special market, that was namely created to hedge 
against credit problems, offering participants the possibility to particularly hedge against 
low-rated underlyings. Therefore, one could have expected investors to hedge increasingly in 
relatively low-rated (i.e. higher-risk) issuers, and this could occur in the CDS market. Thus, 
inter alia, one could have assumed that, either because of increased awareness or higher risk 
aversion, there would be more of the market going towards ‘higher risk’ (i.e. lower-rated) 
transactions, with the implication that market participants - due to higher risk aversion - 
would shift towards hedging in lower-rated sovereigns. Interestingly, the opposite is 
                                                 
10 The problem of reversed causation might raise as an issue here, i.e. ratings are changed as a function of the 
CDS rates. We believe, however, that this is not the case, since the credit derivate market is still relatively new 
in the financial landscape, and rating agencies do not (yet?) seem to take into account CDS rates when 
sovereign ratings are given or indeed modified (see Fitch, 2003). 
11 In table 9, lower values for ratings, as observed in the Russian and Brazilian case, imply that ratings are 
biased towards higher-rated issuers (with Aaa/AAA-rated sovereigns, for example, being assigned the 
numerical value of 1). This implies the flight to quality mentioned in the text. 
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observed in the two major crises we examine, namely Russia and Brazil
12. The evidence 
reported here (see table 9) seems to suggest that the CDS market seems to shift towards 
higher-rated underlyings. This shows the phenomena of flight to quality, which confirms the 
stylized fact in other asset markets
13.  
 
Table 9. Change in Ratings before and after crises. The table below shows average Ratings 
as well as its standard deviation before and after a three month crisis window, centered around the 
crisis date, for respectively the Russian, Brazilian and Ecuadorian Crisis. 
 






        












              
Ratings 
(Average)  8.75 8.1    8.24  6.94    9.5  9.5 
S.E.   2.5  3.6    3.88  3.86    244  2.75 
 
  
We next move to a deeper analysis of this issue by looking at demand-supply balances. 
  
B.   The Demand and Supply for Sovereign Credit Hedging before and after Financial 
Crises 
In this section, we study the effects of crises on the number of bids, asks and transactions of 
credit default swaps. In particular, we address the following questions: Is there more demand 
for sovereign credit hedging before or after the crises? Are there more CDS transactions 
before, during or after crisis? When there are quotes, do we get to deals – that is to say actual 
transactions observed - more easily before or after? 
  
For this, we define three months windows before the crises occurring in Russia, Brazil and 




                                                 
12 There is no change in ratings observed for the relatively minor crisis, Ecuador, where dealings remain at the 
same ratings class. 
13 Again, this might seem surprising, since the CDS market, a pure sovereign credit risk market, exists for 
hedging particularly risky underlyings, and one might have assumed ex ante that investors would shift towards 
higher-risk credit derivatives. This is not supported by the reported data above, where the evidence suggests that 
investors proceed to ‘flight tow quality’, i.e. higher-rated (lower-risk) CDSs. 
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Table 10.  Summary of Total Dataset. The table shows the total number of transactions, two and 
one way quotes. Also, the ratio of transaction data to quotes are shown. This is done for each of the 
three crises under study here for a three months before and after crisis window. 
 
   Russia     Brazil    Ecuador 
        












                 
No.  Transactions 52 48   35 37   49 26 
No. Two Way 
quotes (Bids & 
Asks)  222 220   262 270   439 227 
No. One Way 
quotes (Bids)  238 265   213 239   288 166 
No. One Way 
quotes (Asks)  242 168   403 360   361 203 
Ratio 
Transactions/Bid 
Two  Way  Quotes 0.23 0.22   0.13 0.14   0.11 0.11 
Ratio 
Transactions/Bid 
One Way Quotes  0.22 0.18   0.16 0.15   0.17 0.10 
Ratio Bid Two 
Way Quotes/ Bid 
One  Way  Quotes  0.93 0.83   0.93 1.13   1.52 0.93 
Ratio Bid One 
Way Quotes/ Bid 
Two Way Quotes  1.07 1.20   0.81 0.89   0.66 0.73 
Ratio Bid/ Ask 
One Way Quotes  0.98 1.57   0.53 0.66   0.80 0.82 
 
  
Following a major credit event such as the Russian default in summer 1998, Table 10 shows 
that the demand for credit hedging increases: we remark a notable increase in the demand for 
Credit Default Swaps, as reflected by the bids of non-transactions data.
14 The number of bids 
– reflecting higher demand for credit hedging - increases, both for one- and two way 
quotes
15, whereas the number of actual transactions remains constant or even decreases. Note 
that the increase in demand occurred even before the actual default, and that the imbalance 
resolved itself within six months after the crisis erupted. While this had no impact on the 
direct relationship between these quotes and ratings, as reported above, it certainly should 
                                                 
14 This result is strongly confirmed for an enlarged window of six months surrounding the crisis period. 
15 See in particular the third and very last row in table 10. 
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have an impact on where transactions are achieved. Notice also that there is a definite 
decrease in the asks – reflecting the willingness to offer (i.e. take on or supply) credit risk - 
once crisis occurred (see fourth row in Table 10). 
  
An explanation of these results may reflect a change in the psychology of markets: a major 
financial crisis creates heightened risk-awareness among investors, and thus the demand for 
credit hedging instruments increases. Investors may be less weary of this credit hedging 
before a financial crisis. 
  
We notice a similar, but less pronounced, effect for the case of the Brazilian crisis at the 
beginning of 1999, but to a lesser extent. The relatively minor Ecuadorian default did not 
affect the markets in similar ways. 
 
 
VI.   DO CRISES REVEAL NEW INFORMATION TO THE WORLD OR SIMPLY INFORMATION 
UNCERTAINTY? 
  At this stage, we focus on the uncertainty that exists about CDS pricing during major 
financial crises. Do crises bring a resolution of information uncertainty - basically provide 
new information on actual levels of credit risk, reflected in the new pricing more based on 
ratings? Or do major financial crises bring more pricing uncertainty to the markets? 
Indeed, as ratings become more powerful at explaining CDS rates during and after crises, one 
may wonder if crises are simply a resolution of information. If that is the case, one would 
expect lower spreads after crises than before. Of course, bid-ask spreads are also affected by 
the quality of the underlying sovereign
16. We thus investigate the impact of crises on bid-ask 
spreads when controlling for quality. 
  
In order to test for the above hypotheses, we proceed as follows. We define three month 
windows centered around each crisis date, and three months ‘outside’ windows (months –6 to 
–3 and +3 to +6). We then run the following regressions:  
 
Ratings Dummy Ratings Dummy Spread A B * * * * ) _ _ log( θ γ β α + + + =
                                                
 
 
We regress the log of bid-ask spreads on ratings, and define a dummy variable which is = 0 
before the crisis and 1 after the crisis. The interaction between the dummy variable and 
ratings will be an indication of whether bid-ask spreads – when controlling for quality (i.e. 
per rating class) – will increase or not after financial crises. 
 
The regression results in table 11 provides clear results concerning the Russian crisis. When 
controlling for quality, spreads increased significantly after the Russian crisis
17. This appears 
 
16 This means that bid-ask spreads can be expected to be different for high-quality (low risk) underlyings (such 
as for example Aaa/AAA rated sovereigns) than for higher risk countries. 
17 See also Appendix I. The mean for bid-ask spreads increases after crises, and this generally irrespective of the 
ratings class considered. 
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in the statistical significance of the interaction variable (dummy*ratings). While CDS rates 
are not affected quantitatively by this interaction variable (i.e. the pricing of ratings does not 
change with the rating) the bid-ask spreads are truly affected. Thus the crisis did not come as 
a resolution of information uncertainty but rather as a new addition to uncertainty to valuing 
sovereign risk world-wide. The cumulative over 6 months before to 6 months after leads to a 
coefficient that is strongly significant both statistically and economically.  
 
Table 11. Russia. Regression results of semi-log test of bid-ask spread on ratings, during three 
month windows centered around the crisis date, and three month outside window (months –6 to –3 
and +3 to +6). Dummy= 0 before the crisis and 1 after the crisis. 
Ratings Dummy Ratings Dummy Spread A B * * * * ) _ _ log( θ γ β α + + + =  
 
                         
               
Three Month Around the Crisis 
Window      Three Month Outside Crisis Window   
             
               
Dependent Variable: log(B_A Spread)    Dependent Variable: log(B_A Spread) 
                         
Variable   Coefficient 
t-
statistic Prob    Variable    Coefficient 
t-
statistic Prob 
               
Constant  -7.91  -47.09 0.00000   Constant  -8.44  -27.62 0.00000 
Dummy  -0.08  -0.36 0.71780   Dummy  0.32  0.99 0.32140 
Ratings  0.18  9.76 0.00000   Ratings  0.23  7.37 0.00000 
Dummy*Ratings  0.06  2.37 0.01840     Dummy*Ratings  0.04  1.27 0.20380 
R
2  0.44           R
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Table 12. Brazil. Regression results of semi-log test of bid-ask spread on ratings, during three 
month windows centered around the crisis date, and three month outside window(months –6 to –3 
and +3 to +6). Dummy= 0 before the crisis and 1 after the crisis. 
Ratings Dummy Ratings Dummy Spread A B * * * * ) _ _ log( θ γ β α + + + =  
 
               
Three Month Around the Crisis 
Window      Three Month Outside Crisis Window   
             
               
Dependent Variable: log(B_A Spread)    Dependent Variable: log(B_A Spread) 
                         
Variable   Coefficient 
t-
statistic  Prob   Variable    Coefficient 
t-
statistic  Prob 
               
Constant  -8.00  -71.51 0.00000   Constant  -7.91  -62.14 0.00000 
Dummy  -0.32  -2.03 0.04240   Dummy  -0.75  -4.47 0.00000 
Ratings  0.26  20.53 0.00000   Ratings  0.21  13.58 0.00000 
Dummy*Ratings  0.01  0.80 0.42500   Dummy*Ratings  0.07  3.89 0.00001 
R
2  0.63           R
2  0.54       
 
Table 13. Ecuador. Regression results of semi-log test of bid-ask spread on ratings, during three 
month windows centered around the crisis date, and three month outside window(months –6 to –3 
and +3 to +6). Dummy= 0 before the crisis and 1 after the crisis. 
Ratings Dummy Ratings Dummy Spread A B * * * * ) _ _ log( θ γ β α + + + =  
 
                          
               
Three Month Around the Crisis 
Window      Three Month Outside Crisis Window   
             
               
Dependent Variable: log(B_A Spread)    Dependent Variable: log(B_A Spread) 
                         
Variable   Coefficient 
t-
statistic  Prob   Variable    Coefficient 
t-
statistic  Prob 
               
Constant  -8.74  -91.83 0.00000   Constant  -8.67  -90.98 0.00000 
Dummy  -0.38  -2.18 0.02900   Dummy  -0.22  -0.98 0.32600 
Ratings  0.27  26.62 0.00000   Ratings  0.28  25.93 0.00000 
Dummy*Ratings  0.02  1.20 0.23030     Dummy*Ratings  -0.03  -1.17 0.24100 
R
2  0.62           R
2  0.67       
  
 
The results shown with the Russian crisis hold in a similar way with the Brazilian crisis 
(Table 12), also the effect, still significant, seems to be delayed. The interaction variable 
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there is strongly significant as well and cumulates over 6 months before and after as well to 
strong levels.  The Ecuadorian crisis (Table 13) did not provide similar effects to credit risk 
pricing to the rest of the world, despite its significance as the first Brady bond default
18. To 
affect overall credit markets, crises appear to need a critical size. 
 
 
VII.     CONCLUSION 
Our study of the credit default swap market around major financial crises leads to several 
results. Markets' consideration of ratings around the world changes dramatically after major 
financial crises. It looks as if market participants were using some other factors before 
financial crises but suddenly congregate around ratings information for pricing default 
straight after crises. It appears as much as a behavioral change as an informational change. 
Interestingly, the pricing relationship of ratings remains the same (there is thus no new 
information on ratings content in that sense) but they suddenly become the most important 
source of information. After crises, there is also a significant flight to quality that is 
accompanied by a strong relative rise of demand for credit protection. This excess demand 
does not translate into more transactions. But it does translate into significantly larger bid-ask 
spreads, even controlling for rating quality. Financial crises thus seem to lead to more 
information uncertainty than information itself. Crises do not appear as a resolution of 
information uncertainty for the rest of the world but rather as creating information 
uncertainty. This could by itself feed back in the sudden need to rely predominantly on what 
could be a weak but rather stable source of information, possibly the information of last 
resort when crises shake pricing systems: ratings. 
  
                                                 
18 See also Appendix I for summary statistics of the underlying data. 
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Appendix I . Bid-Ask spread summary for Russia, Brazilian and Ecuadorian crisis 
 
Bid-Ask Spread Summary: Russia Crisis Summary 
                          
               
    Before Crisis Window  (3-months)     After Crisis Window (3-months) 
                
 Frequency  Mean  S.D.    Frequency  Mean  S.D. 
          
AAA 22  0.00037  0.0002848   42 0.000511  0.0002401 
AA+ 2  0.00035  0.0000707    3  0.000467  0.0001528 
AA 3  0.0006  0.0006083    20  0.00067  0.000323 
A 27  0.0035296  0.0028914    7  0.004614  0.003097 
A- 1  0.0015  n/a    1  0.005  n/a 
BBB+ 55  0.0003209  0.0017656    39  0.00441  0.0020419 
BBB   10  0.00127  0.0005122    1  0.005  n/a 
BBB-   72  0.0016792  0.0020993    63  0.002432  0.0040318 
BB+ 15  0.0058567 0.0060091    18 0.0065  0.0030641 
BB   0  n/a  n/a    17 0.020735  0.013030397 
BB- 2  0.00575  0.003182    3  0.0275  0.0086603 
B+ 10 
  
0.0076  0.0040263    2  0.035  0.0070711 
B 1  0.0165  n.a    1  0.02  n/a 
CCC+ 2  0.04  0.0141421    0  n/a  n/a 
       .         
Total 222  0.00312  0.004644    220  0.00495 0.008113 
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Bid-Ask Spread Summary: Brazilian Crisis Summary 
                          
            
    Before Crisis Window  (3-
months) 
   After Crisis Window (3-months) 
             
  Frequency  Mean S.D.   Frequency  Mean S.D. 
          
AAA 55  0.000612  0.000275   66 0.000465  0.00015 
AA+ 2  0.000775  3.54E-05    0  n/a  n/a 
AA 20  0.000785  0.000372    5  0.00024  5.48E-05 
A  1  0.004 n/a    1  0.003 n/a 
A- 5  0.0031  0.001517    8  0.001563  0.000478 
BBB+ 41  0.004041  0.001827    51  0.00299  0.001837 
BBB    20  0.001355 0.000843    51  0.000858 0.000472 
BBB-   47  0.003932  0.005605    22  0.009955  0.00636 
BB+ 16  0.007763 0.006009    12 0.01  0.005893 
BB   38 0.015355  0.008239    33 0.01347  0.010226 
BB- 12  0.021667  0.007098    0  n/a  n/a 
B+ 1  0.03  n/a    10  0.034  0.016591 
B 2  0.0225  0.003536    11  0.024091  0.010913 
CCC+ 2  0.175  0.035355    0  n/a  n/a 
              
Total 262  0.00702  0.01682    270  0.00604 0.00991 
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Bid-Ask Spread Summary: Ecuador Crisis Summary 
                          
            
    Before Crisis Window  (3-months)     After Crisis Window (3-months) 
             
 Frequency  Mean  S.D.    Frequency  Mean  S.D. 
             
AAA 47  0.000324  0.0000949   16 0.000241  0.00008 
AA+ 2  0.0003  0.0000707    3  0.0003  0.00005 
AA 4  0.0002875  0.0001031    2  0.00045  7.07E-05 
A+ 1  0.001  n/a    1  0.001  n/a 
A 0  n/a  n/a    1  0.002  n/a 
A- 12  0.001357  0.0004363    13  0.0006  0.000327 
BBB+ 8  0.0015  0.000378    0  0  n/a 
BBB   176  0.0013256  0.0007818   91  0.001421  0.001109 
BBB-   89  0.0039427  0.0047528   46 0.00245  0.00193 
BB+ 40  0.0053375  0.00226848    26 0.004865  0.002504 
BB   30 0.0071667  0.0021023   13 0.006192  0.002026 
BB- 0  n/a  n/a   0  n/a  n/a 
B+ 18  0.0078611  0.0021338    8  0.008188  0.003683 
B 10  0.001365  0.0085149    2  0.01125  0.005303 
CCC+ 0  n/a n/a   3  0.02633  0.014613 
              
Total 439  0.003052  0.0038428    227  0.00293 0.00444 
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